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I. Introduction
A class action is a legal action in which a group of people facing
a similar legal issue combine their cases and thus form a “class.” 1
The class action allows the group of people with similar interests
to combine their claims in order “to conserve the resources of both
the courts and the parties,” while at the same time efficiently
litigating the issues. 2 Class actions allow individuals to bring cases
* J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law 2017;
B.A., cum laude Furman University 2014. I would like to thank Professor Joan
Shaughnessy for her advice and guidance as my note advisor, the 2016–17
Editorial Board for the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice for their helpful editing suggestions, and my sister Kiersty for listening
to all of my concerns and sharing her thoughts with me.
1. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.1, at
2 (4th ed. 2002).
2. See Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need to
Know About Class Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 193 (2004)
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that are not valuable enough to have been brought on their own. 3
In some class actions, one or more persons will seek to bring a suit
on behalf of a much larger class, and the other members of this
potential class need to be notified of their involvement in the class. 4
When a class action is formed, named class members are appointed
as representatives of the entire class. 5 They must decide what
ways they will send notice by creating a notice plan, which must
be approved by the court. 6
There are several ways to notify people that they may be
eligible to be in the class. 7 With the growth of population and
technology, parties may seek to send a text message to individuals
as a way to notify that individual that he or she is potentially able
to join the class. 8 When named class representatives decide to give
notice to potential class members, one of the multiple ways in
which they may choose to send notice is to send a text message to
the individual potential class members. 9 The factors that make a
text message a reasonable form of notice vary, and the Federal
Judicial Center has proposed changes to the rules that govern
notice to potential class members. 10
II. History and Purpose of Class Actions
In the year 1199, in Medieval England, a man named Martin
was the rector of a local parish. 11 The members of his parish were
(describing the nature of class actions and how to resolve them).
3. Id.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Theodore Z. Wyman, Sufficiency of Legal Notice Provided by Online
Publication or Electronic Mail in Class Action Suits, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 103, *5
(2014) (explaining what notice courts have found proper, including email and
texts).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, RULE
23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 87 [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT] (Nov. 5–6,
2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18536/download (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
11. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 38 (1987).
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upset with Martin; because of his management of the parish, the
local parishioners had to carry their dead three miles to the
“mother church” in a nearby town while still paying Martin for the
burial. 12 The parishioners and Martin could not resolve their
dispute. Martin then sued the parishioners to collect the offerings
he felt entitled to and to dispute whether the parishioners were
entitled to a daily mass. 13 The court heard the case, but the
outcome has been lost to time. 14
What time has not erased, however, is that the court was
willing to hear the case of Master Martin, Rector of Berkway v.
Parishioners of Nuthamstead. 15 From that fact alone, it is evident
that the medieval English court recognized that a lawsuit was not
always between two individuals. The court recognized that the
parishioners were being represented as a group, and class action
litigation was able to evolve.
In a separate incident in 1255, King Henry III wrote a writ to
the archbishop of Canterbury commanding him to recognize three
or four men of the village as representative of the whole. 16 The
practice of allowing representative litigation had become “the law
and condition of the realm.” 17 In the writ, King Henry wrote
“according to the law and custom of the realm . . . villages and
communities of villeins 18 . . . ought to be able to prosecute their
pleas and complaints in our courts and in those of others through
three of four of their number.” 19
Class representation carried into the eighteenth century,
when English courts heard cases brought on behalf of represented
groups. 20 These historical courts understood the equitable purpose
12. Id. at 48.
13. Id. at 38.
14. Id. at 48.
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 97–98.
17. Id. at 98.
18. A villein is a “person entirely subject to a lord or attached to a manor,
but free in relation to all others; a serf.” Villein, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
19. YEAZELL, supra note 11, at 98 (quoting THE COMMUNITY OF THE VILL, IN
MEDIEVAL STUDIES PRESENTED TO ROSE GRAHAM 1 (V. Ruffer & A.J. Taylor eds.,
Oxford 1950)).
20. See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:12 (5th
ed. 2015) (describing the historical origins of the class action); 7A CHARLES ALAN
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of allowing classes to bring their case; “[t]he class action was an
invention of equity . . . mothered by the practical necessity of
providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not
disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from
enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from
their equitable wrongs.” 21
A. Early Class Action Jurisprudence in the United States
In 1853, the Supreme Court approved of class actions in Smith
v. Swormstedt, 22 in which it allowed a representative suit to be
brought on behalf of all the preachers in the Methodist Episcopal
Church South; the preachers sought a declaration of the respective
rights of each sectional group of the Methodist Episcopal Church
of the United States to funds originally belonging to the entire
church. 23 United States law has evolved to govern the procedural
aspects of creating and maintaining a class action suit.
III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) governs when and
how notice should be provided to potential class members. 24 Rule
23 defines and explains three different types of class actions, and
how notice requirements differ for each type. 25 This note will
address the Federal Rule, but most States have adopted versions
of this rule. 26
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining
the history and purpose of the class action).
21. WRIGHT, supra note 20 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer,
C.C.A., 168 F.2d 182, 187 (1948)).
22. 57 U.S. 288 (1853). Smith addresses a different type of class action than
the type explored in this note, but the example is offered to explore the policy
behind class actions in the United States. Id.
23. Id.
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
25. Id.
26. See NICHOLAS M. PACE, CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 2,
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA__Nation
al_Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (describing the evolution of Rule 23).
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In 1912, Rule 23 read only “When the question is one of
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.” 27 In the
decades following, Rule 23 was revised in order to define the
different categories of class actions. 28
In 1966, the Civil Committee amended Rule 23, and created
the subcategory of Rule 23(b)(3). 29 The (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories
require that classes be established when the individual claims
must be combined in the interest of fairness and/or practicality,
because they are all a result of the same wrongful conduct. 30 The
class members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions cannot opt out of
the class. 31 The new (b)(3) category covered classes so large and
numerous that individual notice may not be reasonable under the
circumstances, and explained the ability for potential class
members to “opt-out” of the class after receiving notice. 32 Most
significantly, it was the first time Rule 23 allowed a class to be
formed based on individual claims that did not need to be
adjudicated together; it allowed a binding class action to be formed
where named class representatives were simply seeking money
damages for similar conduct. 33 Prior to the 1966 amendments, a
class action would not have a preclusive effect on similar claims. 34
The purpose of the notice requirement was to justify extending
the class action judgment to the whole class, while allowing them
an opportunity to escape the binding judgment. 35 Critics of the
amendment complained that this would encourage a class action
where notice is not broad enough to actually reach potential class

27. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (i), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376
(1967) (analyzing the problems with and the effect of the 1966 amendments to
Rule 23).
28. See id. at 375–90 (analyzing the categories of class actions).
29. See id. at 389–90 (explaining subdivision (b)(3)).
30. See id. at 387–92 (explaining subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 392 (explaining the purpose of notice required by (c)(2)).
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members. 36 Supporters of the rule pointed out that individual
notice is not practicable in some circumstances, and that the
Constitution is there to back up Rule 23 in assuring that notice is
fair. 37
Under the current Rule 23, all types of class actions must first
meet the requirements of 23(a), which reads:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. 38

Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) usually do not require notice to all
potential class members to satisfy due process, but it is in the
discretion of the trial judge to determine what notice is required
under (b)(1) and (b)(2). 39 Rule 23(b)(3), however, does require
adequate notice to potential class members. 40 A class may be
formed under Rule 23(b)(3) if “the court finds that questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” 41
The guidelines for providing notice in a case where the class is
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) are outlined in Rule 23(c)(2). 42 In any
class action maintained under subdivision Rule 23(b)(3), the court
must order that the members of the class are afforded the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
36. See id. at 395–96 (explaining that the rule faced criticism because it did
not afford sufficiently intelligible standards and it would not be possible to reach
all of the class members in all of the cases).
37. Id.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
39. See Rodman Ward Jr. & Wayne N. Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics
of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C.L. REV. 557, 558 (1969) (discussing the difficulties of fair
and effective notice and the court’s role in monitoring class actions).
40. Id.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. 43 The notice is required to inform class members on the
nature of the case, the definition of the certified class, the issues
and claims at stake, that the court will exclude the potential class
member from the class if she requests so from the judge within the
specified time frame, and that the judgment will be binding on
class members. 44
A. How Potential Class Members Join A Class
There are two ways in which potential class members become
part of a class. 45 These two methods are known as “opt-out” and
“opt-in”. 46
An opt-in class requires each potential class member to take
affirmative action to join the suit. 47 Unlike class actions under
Rule 23, opt-in classes are statutory and do not concern the same
due process analysis as opt-out classes. This is because a potential
class member in an opt-in action does not lose any legal right or
ability by defecting from the class. 48 A potential class member in
an opt-in case may lose an opportunity to be a part of the class
action without notice, but they may still bring a suit of their own. 49
In an opt-out class, by contrast, “every member of the class is
included in the class suit unless they [ask] to be excluded from the
class.” 50 Therefore, when a person is part of a class action, he or
she is bound by the outcome. 51 He or she will lose the right to bring
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298–304 (2010) (comparing European and
United States class actions and noting the issues with the system in the United
States).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 301.
48. ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9:48
(5th ed. 2015).
49. Id.
50. Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
519, 556 (2003).
51. See Coffee, supra note 45 (detailing the legal consequences of joining a
class action).
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a new suit on their own behalf. 52 This is why, in an opt-out case, it
is a constitutional and legislative requirement that persons who
are a part of the class are afforded notice of their involvement. 53
The opt-in model is less popular than the opt-out, as it is only
allowed by statute. 54 The opt-in model is still in use, but no court
has ever certified an opt-in class action under Rule 23(b)(3). 55
IV. Class Action Basics
A class action usually begins when one or more persons assert
that they, and others in a similar situation, are or will be
damaged. 56 The people making the assertion must also explain
that they represent a larger group of people in a similar situation,
and therefore become the named class representatives. 57 The type
of damage asserted can vary widely, but includes “product liability,
medical liability, consumer fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
antitrust, securities, insurance, employment, and human rights
violations.” 58 The new class may seek damages, injunctive or
equitable relief. 59 The named class representatives who represent
the absent members of the class must have standing to bring the
claim. 60 The named class representatives must also be able to
52. See id. at 298 (explaining the ideology behind class action and that the
judgment is binding on class members).
53. Infra Sections VI, VII.
54. Erichson, supra note 50, at 556.
55. See Doe v. United States, 44 Fed. App’x 499, 500 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (discussing a class certified by the Court of Federal Claims as an opt-in
class action); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir.
2001) (reversing a decertification of an opt-in class action); Katlin v. Tremoglie,
43 Pa. D. & C.4th 373, 374 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County 1999) (certifying an optin class action); see also CONTE & NEWBERG, § 9:48, supra note 48 (outlining the
fundamentals of class actions).
56. See Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 2 (describing how a class action
lawsuit begins). In rare circumstances, a defendant may be the certified class.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21 (2004).
57. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 56 (explaining the
process for getting a class certified).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 61 (detailing burden on named plaintiffs of
certified classes).
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fairly represent the class as a whole, rather than putting their own
interests above those of the entire class. 61 The rights of the absent
class members are protected as a matter of due process, as this
note will address. 62
In order to proceed as a class action, the persons seeking to
create a class must have the class approved and certified by the
court. 63 The judge must determine that a precisely defined class
exists, and that the class representatives are a part of the class. 64
This must be done early in the case. 65 In order for the class to be
approved, the party seeking class certification must meet the
requirements of Rule 23. 66 If the court determines that a class
action is maintainable under section b(3) of Rule 23, the accepted
practice is that one or both of the parties prepare a notice plan for
the court to approve. 67 In the notice plan the plaintiff class
representatives 68 will explain what methods they intend to use to
inform potential class members of their interest in the suit. 69
V. Defining the Parameters of Notice
Rule 23 is not the only guideline that determines when notice
is due. In establishing the foundation for notice requirements, this
note will explore three highly relevant cases from the Supreme
Court. The first case discussed is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co. 70 Mullane does not discuss Rule 23, and does not

61. 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.13,
42 (4th ed. 2002).
62. Id. at 45.
63. See Greenberg & Blazina, supra note 2 (describing the initial steps
needed for a class action to proceed).
64. Id. at 194.
65. Id. at 193.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
67. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., 1 CLASS ACTIONS: IN THE WAKE OF EISEN
III AND IV 39–40 (1976).
68. Occasionally, this may be the defendant. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 56 (explaining the process of certifying a class action).
69. See 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
§1797.6 (3d ed. 2012) (describing the methods by which notice may be ordered).
70. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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involve a class action. 71 However, the case creates the standard for
what notice is required under the due process clause of the
constitution. 72 The next case is Phillips Petroleum Company v.
Shutts, 73 which addresses when notice must be sent to potential
class members under due process. 74 The last major Supreme Court
case this note will analyze is Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin. 75
Eisen explains how to read the notice requirements of Rule 23, and
clarifies that the notice requirements of Rule 23 are more rigid
than Mullane and, therefore, more rigid than the constitution. 76
VI. Constitutional Requirements of Due Process in Notice
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
dictate that United States Citizens may not have their life, liberty
or property taken from them without due process. 77 These
amendments require that a citizen must have a fair trial before the
government may deprive them of their life, liberty, or property. 78
A. Mullane
The Supreme Court in Mullane explained: “Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a
minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing.” 79

71. See generally id.
72. See id. at 315 (requiring that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).
73. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
74. Id. at 803.
75. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
76. See id. (concluding that Rule 23 requires more of notice than the
Constitution).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VIV.
78. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
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In Mullane, 113 private small trusts were pooled into a
common trust fund at Central Hanover Bank in New York. 80 There
was testimony at the trial that there were about 350 current
beneficiaries, and up to 2,000 persons with relevant interests. 81
This case was not brought under a class action theory, however the
case still addressed what notice was proper to satisfy due process. 82
A New York statute required banks to follow a specific plan of
notice by publication when deciding to settle the accounts in the
common fund. 83 The statute required one type of notice, and only
one type of notice, regardless of whether the beneficiaries were
identifiable. 84 The bank was required to publish notice in a
newspaper at least once a week for four weeks, and there was no
requirement for individual notice. 85 The bank complied, and the
only notice that it gave was “by newspaper publication setting
forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name
and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list
of all participating estates, trusts or funds.” 86 The appellant 87 then
objected to the statutory notice requirements, and the actual notice
given, on the grounds that the notice was insufficient and therefore
it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 88
The landmark Mullane decision explained that the
fundamental constitutional requirements of notice are satisfied
when “notice [is] reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”89 The court explained that notice must reasonably
“convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
80. Id. at 309.
81. John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common Trust
Funds, and the Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1963, 1698 n.17 (2015).
82. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 310.
86. Id.
87. The appellant in this case was a statutorily appointed guardian ad litem
who was responsible for representing the interests of all of the trust beneficiaries.
Id.
88. Id. at 311.
89. Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
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time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due
regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these
conditions are reasonably met the constitutional requirements are
satisfied.” 90
The court also emphasized that notice could not be a “mere
gesture”. 91 It reasoned that due process requires that “[t]he means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen
method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected.” 92 The court explained
that when it is not reasonable to send notice under these
conditions, the chosen method of notice must not be substantially
less likely to give notice than any other “feasible and customary”
method. 93 The court in Mullane ultimately decided that, in this
case, publication by newspaper was insufficient to accord due
process. 94 The court explained:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed
here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the
fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident
that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the
question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions
founded on process constructively served through local
newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local
resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area
of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the
information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance
of actual notice is further reduced when as here the notice
required does not even name those whose attention it is
supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who
might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on the basis
of equivalence with actual notice we are unable to regard this
as more than a feint. 95

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, the court did not intend to say that the bank had to
ascertain the names and addresses of all beneficiaries involved.
The bank was only required to provide notice to current trust
beneficiaries of known place and residence. 96 The court explained
that, as to those beneficiaries whose information could not be
ascertained with “due diligence,” the New York Statute’s required
notice was sufficient. 97 The court also explained that, even if the
beneficiaries could be ascertained with “due diligence” the bank
wasn’t required to do any investigating to discover the information
for beneficiaries. 98 The bank was not required to obtain
information outside of its normal course of business because
requiring the bank to stay informed of this information would
impose a severe burden. 99 The New York statutory notice was
ruled “inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone,
but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other
means at hand.” 100
B. Phillips Petroleum
A class action is a unique situation in which the named
representatives in the class are representing the interests of third
parties who are not present. 101 Phillips addressed the personal
jurisdiction issues in a class action where potential class members
are not present. 102 Phillips involved a multi-state class action suit
brought by royalty owners against Phillips Petroleum Company for
withholding interest payments on royalties. 103 This suit was
brought in Kansas state court and the defendant opposed class
certification on the ground that the Kansas court could not
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the vast

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 317.
Id.
Id
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985).
Id. at 799.
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majority of the absent class members who lacked minimum
contacts with Kansas. 104 The Supreme Court explained:
Petitioner claims that failure to execute and return the “request
for exclusion” provided with the class notice cannot constitute
consent of the out-of-state plaintiffs; thus Kansas courts may
exercise jurisdiction over these plaintiffs only if the plaintiffs
possess the sufficient “minimum contacts” with Kansas as that
term is used regarding out-of-state defendants in personal
jurisdiction cases. 105

Although the Phillips court “recognized that class plaintiffs were
in danger of losing the property interests represented by their
claims, it reasoned that they were unlikely to be subjected to
judgments against them, or to other significant burdens such as
discovery, costs, or attorneys’ fees.” 106
The court rejected both a “minimum contacts” test in class
actions and a requirement that a person “opt-in” in order to join
the class. 107 It explained that the jurisdictional issues are satisfied
if procedural due process protections are provided. 108 The Phillips
court explained that the function of notice is to allow potential
class members a fair chance of excusing themselves from the
class. 109 It explained: “[T]he interests of the absent plaintiffs are
sufficiently protected by the forum State when those plaintiffs are
provided with a request for exclusion that can be returned within
a reasonable time to the court.” 110 In general, the Court
emphasized that an opt-out opportunity is an important
component of due process in damage class actions. 111

104. Id. at 806.
105. Id.
106. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1,
11–12 (1986).
107. See Phillips, 472 U.S. at 808, 812 (“We reject petitioner's contention that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent
plaintiffs affirmatively ‘opt-in’ to the class, rather than be deemed members of the
class if they do not ‘opt-out.’”).
108. Id. at 803.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 814.
111. Erichson, supra note 50, at 555.
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C. Eisen

The petitioner in Eisen originally brought his suit on behalf of
all buyers and sellers of “odd lots” on the stock market exchange,
alleging that the respondent brokerage firms had violated the
Sherman Act when they monopolized the trade and set the
differential too high and that the exchange itself violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when it failed to protect the
investors. 112 The petitioner’s class was later limited to investors
who had traded in odd lots between May 1, 1962 and June 30,
1966. 113 The case was juggled between the district and appellate
courts in New York three times, and the third time the District
Court heard the case it ruled on the issue of notice. 114 The District
Court found that the prospective class included six million
individuals and institutions, and “with reasonable effort some two
million of these odd-lot investors could be identified by name and
address; and that the names and addresses of an additional
250,000 persons who had participated in special investment
programs . . . could also be identified with reasonable effort.” 115
The court explained that using the first-class rate of postage, it
would cost $225,000 to provide individual notice to all identifiable
class members, plus additional expenses for notice by publication
to reach the other four million potential class members. 116
In the appellate case preceding the third District Court case,
petitioner had argued that that mailing notice to each identifiable
plaintiff would be so expensive he would have to drop his case, and
asked for permission to provide notice by publication instead. 117
Petitioner’s monetary interest in the suit was only seventy dollars,
so the suit had to be a class action or no lawyer would pursue the
case. 118 The Supreme Court heard the case after it was reviewed
by the Court of Appeals a third time. 119 The Supreme Court
emphasized that under Rule 23(c) individual notice must be
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 160 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 166–67.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974).
Id. at 169.
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provided to class members who are identifiable through reasonable
effort. 120 The Supreme Court explained that in the Eisen case, the
names and addresses of 2,250,000 class members were easily
ascertainable, and there was no showing that individual notice
could not be mailed to every identifiable class member. 121 It also
emphasized that individual notice, when possible through
reasonable effort, is not something to be discretionarily waived; it
is an unambiguous requirement under Rule 23(c). 122 It explained
that individual notice requirements may not be tailored to fit the
“pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs,” and that petitioner must
bear the cost of providing notice. 123
VII. Best Notice Practicable and Reasonable Effort Under Rule 23
Mullane helped clarify what is proper notice under the due
process clause, but courts have not had rigid guidelines when
deciding what constitutes the best notice practicable under Rule
23. 124 Court decisions evaluating notice plans depend on various
elements in the factual situation, including the size of the class and
“whether the class members can be identified easily (for example,
by stockholder lists, computer printouts of customers, or any other
form of record accessible to the class representative), and the
probability that publication notice, if used, would or would not
reach its intended audience” 125
Some courts have found a combination of individual notice and
publication notice to be the best notice practicable under the
circumstances. 126 “This alternative has often been ordered by
courts where some members of the class could be identified by a
reasonable method, such as customer or stockholder lists, but other
120. Id. at 175.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, What Constitutes “Best Notice
Practicable,” Required by Rule 23(c)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
Class Actions Brought Under Rule 23(b)(3), 32 A.L.R. FED. 102 § 2 (1977)
(explaining the different approaches taken to provide notice and how courts have
addressed them).
125. See id. (collecting cases).
126. See id. (analyzing the approach taken by different courts).
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class members could not be identified, for example, transferees of
stock where no transfer lists were kept .” 127 “Some courts have
ruled that Rule 23 allows the use of publication notice when used
in combination with individual notice, “when the notice can be
published where it is likely to be seen and read by the
unidentifiable class members. Under certain circumstances,
however, it has been held that individual notice combined with
publication notice for unidentifiable class members was not the
best practicable method of notice.” 128
There is no defined way to make a “reasonable effort” to
provide notice under Rule 23. 129 Individual notice to all class
members has been required in cases where parties have access to
lists of class members available from corporations, transfer agents,
or broker firms. 130 In some class actions brought under Rule 23(b)
the notice plan has requested to have notice sent in the defendant’s
monthly statement, billing, or similar mailing, in order to save
costs. 131 Courts have sometimes rejected this approach, because
these lists can be over or under inclusive depending on when the
lists were created and updated. 132
Courts have sometimes allowed publication notice, through
mediums including newspapers and media outlets, to be sufficient
on its own when class members could not be reasonably identified
and contacted, or could not be identified at all. 133 However,
publication notice alone has been held not sufficient where
members of the class were readily identifiable. 134 It is not entirely
clear when publication notice is sufficient alone, but the Supreme
Court in Eisen explained that when a reasonable effort under Rule

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. (demonstrating multiple methods of notice).
130. See Robeson, supra note 124, at § 2 (providing examples of when
individual notice to potential class members has been required).
131. See id. (detailing notice plan requests).
132. See id. (describing the approach courts have taken to some notice plan
requests).
133. Id.
134. See id. (explaining the standard of notice when class members are readily
identifiable).
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23(c) makes individual notice possible, there is no substitute for
individual notice. 135
A. Reasonable Notice Plans in Class Actions
When a plaintiff is seeking a class action, they must, among
other things, present a plan to the court detailing how they intend
to provide notice to potential class members. 136 There is no one
right way to create a notice plan. 137 Notice plans may indicate an
intention to provide notice to potential class members through a
variety of mediums, including cell phones. 138
The Federal Judicial Center created a Notice Plan checklist in
2010 for judges to use as they evaluate notice plans. 139 The
checklist provides questions for the judges to consider, including
“Is the notice plan conducive to reaching the demographics of the
class?”, “Is the coverage broad and fair? Does the plan account for
mobility?”, and “Does the plan include individual notice?” 140
Although this checklist provides some direction to judges, the
process of approving a notice plan is still largely in the discretion
of each individual judge. 141
B. Courts Differ on Appropriate Methods of Notice
District Courts have not had much occasion to discuss whether
text messages are an appropriate form of notice in particular
circumstances. The small number of District Courts that have
135. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175–76 (1974)
(emphasizing the importance of individual notice to identifiable class members).
136. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 67.
137. See WRIGHT, supra note 69 (demonstrating that there are multiple
effective ways to create a notice plan).
138. See generally Wyman, supra note 7 (explaining that courts have broad
discretion in determining what kinds of notice are acceptable).
139. See generally Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process
Checklist and Plain Language Guide, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2010) [hereinafter
Judges’
Class
Action
Checklist],
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf.
140. Id. at 2.
141. See Wyman, supra note 7 (explaining that notice plans vary and it is
ultimately up to the judge’s discretion to approve or disapprove).
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expressed an opinion in the matter have not consistently approved
or disapproved of notice through text messages; their reactions
have been mixed. 142
1. Disapproval of Text Messages
In Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, 143 Jermyn successfully created
a class action to sue Best Buy for failing to meet their price match
guarantee. 144 His class consisted of
All New York citizens and residents who, from January 10, 2002
until the present, made a purchase at Best Buy and within 30
days (14 days for computers, monitors, notebook computers,
printers, camcorders, digital cameras and radar detectors) after
the purchase found a lower price from an entity qualifying
under Best Buy’s published price match guarantee on an
available product of the same brand and model, provided
verification of the lower price to Best Buy and were denied the
benefit of Best Buy’s price match guarantee. 145

Jermyn’s notice plan sought to alert individuals to their class
eligibility through, among other mediums, a post on twitter,
individual [text] messages, and email. 146 Best Buy objected to the
use of all three of these methods. 147 The court agreed with Best
Buy, explaining that “[I]ndividual notice is impossible because
neither Best Buy nor Jermyn has any way of identifying customers
who unsuccessfully sought a price match under Best Buy’s price142. Compare Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 00214 (CM), 2010
WL 5187746, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (concluding that the notice plan was
denied as to the Twitter, text message, and email elements), with In re AT&T
Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (finding that class notice was adequate where the defendant sent notice
by text message, along with other methods), and In re Penthouse Exec. Club
Comp. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 1145 KMW, 2014 WL 185628, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
2014) (ruling that the notice complied with all constitutional requirements,
including those of due process, when notices were distributed via mail, text
message and website), and Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp., No. 14-CV2625 RJS, 2015 WL 4240985, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015) (finding that
Plaintiffs may provide notice to potential opt-in Plaintiffs via a text message).
143. No. 08 Civ. 00214 (CM), 2010 WL 5187746 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010)
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. at *5.
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match guarantee; Best Buy does not maintain a list of such
customers.” 148 The court explained that there is an alternative,
“[I]n situations . . . where class members cannot be identified for
purposes of sending individual notice, notice by publication is
sufficient.” 149 The court explained that a twitter post was not
appropriate because it reached a group of people much larger than
the potential class, and research suggested that most of the visitors
to the twitter page went there for technical support. 150 The court
explained that there were two major downsides to posting on
twitter, “first, notice cannot be limited to Best Buy customers in
New York, and the class here is comprised solely of New York
residents. Second, there is no way to assure that notice via Twitter
will result in notice to even a single class member, let alone a
substantial number of class members.” 151 The court then explained
that [text] messages were inappropriate for similar reasons as a
twitter post; the list of telephone numbers held by Best Buy
included members who were excluded from the class (Best Buy
Employees and members of Best Buy’s Loyalty Program). 152 The
court explained “Although Best Buy may be able to restrict its text
messages to New York customers, there is no link between the list
of mobile telephone numbers (which includes individuals excluded
from the class definition) and class members.” 153 The court also
reasoned that the list of mobile telephone numbers was even more
flawed than a twitter post, because the list was under-inclusive as
it contained only a select group of possible customers. 154

148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent.Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317
(1950)).
150. Id. at *5–6.
151. Id. at *6; but see Macarz v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 54, 61 (D.
Conn. Jan. 8, 2001) (allowing individual notice to an over-inclusive list of class
member when the list contained the entire universe of class members, although
25% of the list was not part of the class).
152. Id. at *7.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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2. Approval of Text Messages

A District Court in Illinois approved a notice plan allowing
notice by text message. 155 In the case of In re AT& T Mobility
Wireless Data, 156 the plaintiffs and AT&T agreed on a settlement
after the plaintiffs accused AT&T of breaking the law by charging
internet taxes. 157 Fifty-seven plaintiffs and AT&T filed a joint
motion to certify the class for settlement purposes, and it was
granted. The court also approved the notice plan and said it
satisfied Rule 23. 158 The notice plan indicated that AT&T would
send both a message with each customer’s monthly bill and a text
message to its current customers. Former customers would receive
notice via email, if they had provided an email address to AT&T,
or by U.S. Mail otherwise. 159 Several class members objected to the
settlement, and many of the objectors complained that the notice
was inadequate. 160 Dr. Florence had served as the interim
settlement administrator, held a P.H.D. in research and statistics,
and testified at the hearing about the notice plan. 161 He explained
how he examined AT&T’s data with them in order to devise a
notice plan. 162 The notice plan that the parties had created
provided multiple types of notice, including inserts into current
customers’ bills, text messages, publication, and email. 163 AT&T
sent notice by text message to more than 32-million class members
who were customers as of September 14, 2010. 164 Several of the
objecting class members complained that the text messages were
under-inclusive, but the court explained “[t]hese objections are

155. See In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (evaluating whether a text message is an
appropriate form of individual notice given the circumstances).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 940.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 944–49.
161. Id. at 952.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 953.
164. Id. at 968.
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misplaced. Due process does not require that every class member
receive notice.” 165
Another case in which a court reviewed a part of a notice plan
was In re Penthouse Executive Club. 166 The matter was originally
brought to court when entertainers/dancers from the Penthouse
Executive Club sued, alleging that they were wrongfully classified
as private contractors and the Club used that as an excuse to extort
fees and tips from them. 167 The settlement class consisted of “all
individuals who perform or performed at the Penthouse Executive
Club as entertainers from on or about January 1, 2004 through
June 12, 2012, including any individual who has signed an
‘Entertainer License Agreement’ or any other agreement
containing a class or collective action waiver.” 168 The notice plan
included notice “sent by first-class mail to each respective Class
Member at his or her last known address . . . . provided on
www.stripperweb.com . . . and two text messages [were sent] to
Class Members on August 9, 2013 and September 10, 2013,” and a
settlement website was created. 169 The court did not analyze why
text messages were appropriate, nor did the court describe how the
phone numbers of approximately 1,230 class members were
obtained, but the court allowed the notice. 170 It is evident from this
that the parties were able to reasonably obtain these numbers and
the class action was still financially viable.
Another case in which the court approved of text messages as
a form of notice was Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp. 171 This
case addressed whether the class could be certified as a collective
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 172 The plaintiffs
165. See id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314–15 (1950)).
166. No. 10 Civ. 1145 (KMW), 2014 WL 185628 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014)
(approving notice plan that included text messages to potential class members).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *7.
170. Id. at *2.
171. No. 14-CV-2625 RJS, 2015 WL 4240985 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015) (finding
that Plaintiffs may provide notice to potential opt-in Plaintiffs via a text message).
172. Id. at *1. The class was not certified under Rule 23, and therefore this
case analyzed notice by text message outside of Rule 23 requirements. Id.
However, the case is still a useful example of whether a court considers text
messages an appropriate and viable form of notice.
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alleged that, working under the defendants in fast food
restaurants in New York, they were denied minimum wage,
overtime, and uniforms, and the deducted unauthorized tips from
their employees. 173 The plaintiffs’ notice plan included direct mail,
a workplace posting at the offending restaurant’s location, and a
text message. The parties agreed that the notice should be
distributed in both Thai and English, but the restaurant did not
agree that a workplace posting and text messages were
appropriate forms of notice. 174 The plaintiffs argued that text
messages were appropriate because many of the restaurant
employees were transient and potential class members had
changed residences since beginning work at the restaurant. 175 The
restaurant opposed the text messages, alleging that the plaintiffs
could not demonstrate that notification via text message was
appropriate “in light of individuals’ privacy interests in their
cellular phone numbers and the ease with which individuals may
distort electronic data.” 176 The court found that, “given the high
turnover in the restaurant industry,” notice by text message was
appropriate. 177 The court also noted that the restaurant primarily
communicated with their employees through text messages, and
therefore their objection to text messages based on privacy
interests held very little weight. 178
VIII. When is a Text Message a Reasonable Form of Notice?
A. It is Likely to Reach the Potential Class Members
As the relevant cases above illustrate, determining whether
text messages are an appropriate form of notice is a very factintensive process. 179 It is safe to say, however, that when providing
notice to potential class action plaintiffs, the best notice is
173. Id.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id. at *5.
176. Id.
177. Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp., No. 14-CV-2625 RJS, 2015 WL
4240985 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015).
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying footnotes 142–178.
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individual notice. 180 The Supreme Court has explained “individual
notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary
consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23 . . . . Accordingly, each class
member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be
notified . . . . ”181 If most individuals in the United States own a cell
phone that they use regularly, it follows that text messages sent to
cell phones may be one of the best ways to provide individual
notice.
1. Likelihood of an Individual Owning a Cell Phone in the
United States
The amount of United States citizens with cell phones could
have a large impact on a fact-based analysis of a notice plan. A
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2013 found that
over ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone. 182 This
percentage remained steady through July of 2015. 183 Additionally,
sixty-four percent of adults own a smart phone. 184 Americans are
downloading smart phone applications en masse; “Apple reported
earlier this year that twenty five billion applications had been
downloaded on its iOS platform to date; Google estimated twenty
billion had been downloaded on the Android platform.” 185 If the
named class representatives can reasonably access data collected
by cell phone companies, or application databases, it would be
reasonable to require that the named class representatives acquire
180. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (explaining
that individual notice is required when potential class members are identifiable).
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (June 6, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phoneownership-hits-91-of-adults/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
183. Device Ownership Over Time, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/device-ownership/ (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
184. Id.
185. Somini Sengupta, Mobile App Developers Scoop up Vast Amounts of
Data, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 12, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/
mobile-app-developers-scoop-up-vast-amounts-of-data-reports-say/?_r=0. (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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the phone numbers of potential class members in order to provide
individual notice to them. While smart phones have multiple
capabilities, such as receiving email and checking the internet,
text messages may be the most likely way to provide individual
notice. A 2013 Pew Research Study showed that eighty-one percent
of people use their cell phones to check their messages, while only
sixty percent use them to access the internet and only fifty-two
percent use their phones to check their email. 186
2. It is an Efficient Method of Communicating with Potential
Class Members
One of the factors that courts consider when evaluating
whether a notice plan is reasonable is its efficiency. 187 When the
current version of Rule 23 was created in 1966, the Advisory
Committee explained that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions were meant
to include “cases in which a class action would achieve economies
of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as
to persons similarly situated.” 188 The Mullane case explained that
some methods of notice may increase in efficiency as time
progresses, specifically explaining that notice by mail is considered
efficient. 189 Therefore, as new methods become more efficient, they
are more reasonable. Another Supreme Court case, Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 190 explained that the use of “less
reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where, as here, ‘an
inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is
available.’” 191 In some cases, potential class members’ cell phone
186. Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/19/cell-phone-activities-2013/ (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
187. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (“[C]ontinued
exclusive reliance on an ineffective means of service is not notice ‘reasonably
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.’”).
188. D. Rhett Brandon, Notice Cost Problems Under Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2)
After Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 1979 DUKE L.J. 882, 883 (1979).
189. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)
(“However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as
an efficient and inexpensive means of communication.”).
190. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
191. Id. at 799 (quoting Greene, 456 U.S. at 455).
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numbers may be easy to acquire. 192 Depending on the individual
circumstances, text messages can be much cheaper than spending
millions on mass publication campaigns. 193 It may also be the best
method of providing individual notice. The cost of obtaining the
data necessary for sending notice through a text message will vary
widely depending on the case. The exact cost of sending a text
message to each potential class member is less important than the
ratio of what the notice costs are as compared to the amount each
class member stands to gain in a money damages case. 194
IX. When is a Text Message an Unreasonable Form of Notice?
A. Phone Number Data is Available but too Broad to be
Reasonable
In some cases, it will not be easy to collect data of potential
class action members. For example, in Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores
the proposed potential notice plan required Best Buy to inform its
New York customers of the ongoing suit. 195 However, Best Buy was
unable to restrict the customer phone number list to include only
the potential class members. 196 The list of phone numbers included
employees of the store, and they were not eligible to be a part of
the class. 197 The court found that texting all of the customers
without restricting the texts to only class members violated Rule
192. See In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (allowing notice by text message where AT&T
was able to inform its own cellular phone customers of the class action through
text messages).
193. See Zachary W. Biesanz & Thomas H. Burt, Everything That Requires
Discovery Must Converge: A Counterintuitive Solution to A Class Action Paradox,
47 U.S.F. L. REV. 55, 84 (2012) (discussing the disadvantages of class actions,
including the potential costs involved).
194. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action
Procedure in the United States, Presented Conference: Debates over Group
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, Geneva, Switzerland (July 2000),
https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf.
195. See Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 00214 (CM), 2010 WL
5187746, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (explaining the proposed notice plan and
objections to it).
196. Id. at *7.
197. Id.
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23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that notice plans
should not be over inclusive. 198
The argument against over-inclusiveness does not carry very
much weight, however. Notice by publication is necessarily
overbroad. Any person reading the newspaper may come across a
notice publication. Additionally, it seems to be an argument arising
outside of law. The primary concern of providing notice is to ensure
people are not deprived of their rights; the fact that some people
may be notified unnecessarily does not seem important enough to
risk depriving a person of their rights. 199
B. Class Members are Likely to Be Impoverished
It may also be unreasonable to send text messages to potential
class members when potential class members are likely to be
impoverished and therefore without cellphones. 200 There is a large
gap in living standards between the poor and the severely poor. 201
Although twenty-five percent of technically poor households in the
United States own a cell phone, ten percent of poor families have
no telephone access at all. 202 If a potential class is likely to be
significantly composed of the poorest of America’s poor, it is
probably not wise to attempt to reach them by text message.
C. A Text Message is too Unofficial as a Form of Notice
In the Federal Judicial Center checklist for notice plans, the
form asks “Will e‐mailed notice be used instead of postal
mailings?” 203 The checklist provides a paragraph of explanation
198. See id. at *9 (denying the proposed notice plan in part, to the extent that
it sought to provide notice through Twitter, text message, and e-mail messages).
199. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
200. See Robert E. Rector & Kirk A. Johnson, Understanding Poverty in
FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER
No.
1713
(2004),
America,
HERITAGE
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/01/understanding-poverty-in-america
(“[A]pproximately one-tenth [of poor households] have no phone at all) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
201. See id. (giving statistics comparing the means of poor families to severely
poor families).
202. Id.
203. Judges’ Class Action Checklist, supra note 139.
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under each question, and under that particular question it
cautions:
If available, parties should use postal mailing addresses, which
are generally more effective than e-mail in reaching class
members: mail-forwarding services reach movers, and the
influx of “SPAM” e-mail messages can cause valid e-mails to go
unread. If e-mail will be used—e.g., to active e-mail addresses
the defendant currently uses to communicate with class
members—be careful to require sophisticated design of the
subject line, the sender, and the body of the message, to
overcome SPAM filters and ensure readership. 204

Unfamiliar text messages can give rise to some of the same
fears. 205 People receiving text messages about class actions may
think they are the victim of a phone scam. 206 This fear is not
unfounded. Spam text messages are on the rise. 207 However, efforts
are being made to restrict mobile text messaging scams. The 2003
Can Spam Act and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act made
mobile spam illegal. 208 Smartphone users can report mobile spam
to the Federal Communications Commission through the
government website. 209 The major wireless carriers, AT&T, Sprint,
T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless and Bell Mobility all offer ways to
report spam phone numbers. 210

204. Id.
205. See Text Message Spam, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Mar. 2013),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam (“Text message
spam is to your cell phone what email spam is to your personal computer. Both
may try to get you to reveal personal information”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
206. See Signs of a Scam, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2014),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0076-phone-scams#Signs (explaining that
scams may try to get your personal information by offering some sort of cash or
reward) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
207. Nicole Perloth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/technology/text-messagespam-difficult-to-stop-is-a-growing-menace.html?_r=0 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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The technology for combatting spam text messages has been
in place since 2012. 211 Cell phone providers collect phone numbers
associated with the spam and report them to a shared database. 212
Additionally, spam e-mail is at a twelve-year low 213, and this trend
may continue with cell phones as consumers report more spam text
messages.
X. Text Messages May Become a More Reasonable Form of Notice
A. Cell Phones Will Grow in Popularity
Cell phones are growing in popularity, and are considered to
be necessities rather than luxuries. 214 As we move forward with
technology and more people gain access to cell phones, this could
be a very affordable, practical and effective way to reach potential
plaintiffs in a class action. Poor families are starting to rely on cell
phones for internet access. 215 As internet becomes more crucial to
everyday life, we can expect to see more families with cell phones.
B. Text Messages May Be an Improvement to Postal Mail
The Mullane case explained that notice should be provided by
the best means possible; “Where the names and post office
addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the
reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to
211. See Amy Gahran, Getting text spam? New service helps you report it, CNN
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/19/tech/mobile/text-spam-gahran/
(describing a system used to report spam text messages) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
212. Id.
213. Spam email levels at 12-year low, BBC, July 27, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33564016 (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
214. See Catherine Rampell, Luxury, or Necessity?, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX
(Feb. 9, 2009, 6:02 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/luxury-ornecessity/?_r=0 (debating whether cell phones are considered a necessity in the
United States); see also Device Ownership Over Time, supra note 183.
215. See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smart Phone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in2015/ (describing how many adults in the United States own smart phones) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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apprise them of its pendency.” 216 The central motivation behind
the court’s ruling in Mullane was to make parties in a class action
case use the method of notice that was most likely to reach the
class members; Mullane explained:
The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any
chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected or, where conditions
do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is
not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes. 217

Comparing the levels of homelessness and persons without
addresses to the levels of people without cell phones today shows
an inverse trend. 218 The principle behind Mullane’s reasoning is
that the notice should be able to reach the intended persons by
method most likely to reach a person. In cases where potential
class members are likely to be homeless, it follows that text
messages may become more likely to reach potential class
members than the traditional method of paper mail.
XI. Proposed Rule 23 Changes
The Rule 23 subcommittee has been actively discussing
changes to the rule since late 2014. 219 The subcommittee has
recommended changes to Rule 23 (b)(3) as follows:
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice [by the most
appropriate means, including first class mail, electronic, or other
means] {by first class mail, electronic mail, or other appropriate

216.
217.
218.

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
Id. at 315.
Compare NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA 2016 9 (2016), http://www.endhomelessness.org/
page/-/files/Chapter_1_online.pdf (depicting the year-to-year change in the overall
homeless population in the U.S. from 2007 to 2015), with Smith, supra note 215
(“64% of American adults now own a smartphone of some kind, up from 35% in
the spring of 2011.”).
219. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10.
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means} to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. 220
The notes to the proposed change explain that paper mail is
no longer the “gold standard.” 221 The committee explains that,
following Eisen’s interpretation of individual notice requirements
for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, many courts have determined that
first class mail is necessary in every case. 222 They go on to explain
that technological changes have provided methods of
communication that are more commonly used by many people. 223
The committee explains:
As that technological change has evolved, courts and counsel
have begun to employ new technology to make notice more
effective, and sometimes less costly. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) is amended
to take account of these changes, and to call attention to them.
No longer should courts assume that first class mail is the ‘gold
standard’ for notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. As amended,
the rule calls for giving notice ‘by the most appropriate means.’
It does not specify any particular means as preferred. Although
it may often be true that online methods of notice, for example
by email, are the most promising, it is important to keep in mind
that a significant portion of class members in certain cases may
have limited or no access to the Internet. 224

The proposed rule change alludes that there are other means for
potential class members to receive notice, rather than the
traditional method of paper mail. The committee’s notes on the
proposed rule change do not specifically suggest text messages as
a form of notice, but they certainly open the door for the discussion.
XII. Conclusion
In every situation involving a notice plan, the reasonableness
of sending a text message as a form of notice is very fact specific. 225
220. Id. at 87.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying footnotes 142–178 (describing the facts of
various cases in which notice through text messages was approved or not
approved).
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With the ever-growing popularity of cell phones, it seems that text
messages are more and more likely to be the best way to provide
individual notice. 226 Potential class members may have moved, or
their address is simply too costly to obtain. If it is efficient and
reasonable to obtain the phone numbers of potential class
members, it is the best way to provide individual notice.
I recommend that the subcommittee adopts the revised Rule
23. The Rule 23 Committee notes that sometimes electronic
notification can be more efficient. 227 Text messages may be, in
some cases, the most efficient and most reliable way to provide
individual notice to people. The small amount of applicable case
law leans in favor of accepting text messages as part of a notice
plan, 228and the trend in cell phone use in the United States
suggests that most people have, or will soon have, access to text
messages. 229 The proposed rule will encourage judges to accept text
messages as part of a notice plan more readily, and the rule will
provide clarity to parties when they are creating a notice plan. The
proposed rule is a reflection of the law adapting to modern
technology, and it is a necessary adaption.

226. See Smith, supra note 215 (providing the statistics for increased cell
phone ownership in the United States).
227. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 87 (explaining how notice
should adapt to technological advances).
228. Supra text accompanying footnotes 142–178.
229. Supra text accompanying footnotes 214, 215, 218.

